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THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HOW THINGS SEEM
MARCIA BARON*

1. The prospectus for this Symposium spoke of assessing the significance of appearances, and my assignment was to examine the expressive dimension of our actions. To what extent is it morally
important? As I reflected on the topic and my assignment, I felt sure
that the expressive dimension of our actions is very important indeed,
but I was less convinced of the importance of how our actions appear
to others. I decided to address both questions, with an emphasis on
their divergence.
To what extent are the expressive dimensions of actions morally
important? To what extent and in what way are appearances morally
important? The questions differ, because appearances need not be
reality, and indeed, we usually mean the word "appearances" to contrast with reality. My gesture can appear warm without being so. By
contrast, my action cannot express warmth unless there really is warmth
there. For my action to express warmth, there has to be warmth in or
behind the action, and the warmth has to be conveyed to another-to
someone toward whom I have warm feelings. Appearances often contrast with reality, but an action cannot express x unless x is really
there.'
I should clarify that in saying that for the action to express
warmth, the warmth has to be conveyed to another, I do not mean to
be asserting that there has to be an "uptake." I am not claiming, in
other words, that for it to be true that my action expresses warmth, the
intended "recipient" has to be aware of the warmth that my action
expresses. I do not mean to be taking a stand on this. It seems clear
that, in general, an action can express something without it being the
* Professor of Philosophy, University of Illinois. B.A., Oberlin College; M.A., Ph.D.,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I am grateful to Kate Abramson, Cheshire
Calhoun, Deborah Hellman, and Santiago Zorzopulos for comments on an earlier draft of
this Article, and to allthe discussants at the Symposium-in particular my commentator,
Sarah Buss-for a stimulating discussion.
1. There is an unclarity in the notion of an action expressing something that I am
ignoring for now. I said that an action cannot express x unless x is really there, but where
exactly is "there"? Must x be an attitude or feeling belonging to the actor? No; the action
can express an attitude in virtue of the standard meanings of certain symbols and gestures.
This may not be true of all things that we say an action expresses-warmth, for examplebut there are things that an action can express without the actor having the relevant attitude or emotion.
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case that the person toward whom the expression is directed recognizes the expression for what it is. This is certainly true of disrespect.
A disrespectful action expresses disrespect even if the recipient
doesn't realize it is disrespectful.' (Draco Malfoy's hurling the epithet
"Mudblood" at Hermione Granger was no less disrespectful for the
fact that Hermione had no idea what "Mudblood" meant.3 ) It may be,
though, that there are exceptions to this general rule, and that expressions of warmth are such an exception.
2. I'll start with the first question. In what ways and to what extent is the expressive dimension of an action morally important? To
focus the discussion, I'll talk mainly about two broad types of action:
beneficent acts and respectful acts. Beneficent acts are structurally
different from respectful acts because beneficent acts have as their
point to aid another, while a wide range of aims can be the aim of a
respectful action. The aim of the respectful action may even be completely unconnected to respect (except negatively-certain aims, for
example, to trick someone into doing something he wouldn't otherwise do, are incompatible with the action being respectful). The respectfulness will lie in the tone or manner in which the act was done
and in the underlying attitude of the actor; respectfulness may not be
evident in the aim. By contrast, the beneficence of a beneficent action lies in the aim-in that which the actor aims to do.4
Beneficent acts themselves come in many varieties, though they
all have in common the aim of aiding another. This needn't be the
sole aim, but it has to be one of the aims; and if it is subordinate to
2. Curiously, it is not clear that this holds for respect. Does a respectful action express
respect even if the recipient does not realize it is respectful? Maybe; but we are reluctant to
view an action (or decision, or policy) as respectful if the recipient thinks it is disrespectful.
This has to do with "moral deference," as Laurence Thomas calls it. See Laurence M.
Thomas, Moral Deference, in THEORIZING MULTICULTURALISM: A GUIDE TO THE CURRENT DEBATE 359 (Cynthia Willett ed., 1998). Moral deference involves a presumption in favor of
assertions of those who belong to what Thomas calls a "diminished social category," e.g., id.
at 363, 374, assertions regarding the painfulness of behavior they report finding painfulcertain remarks, displays of certain symbols, and so on. Although Thomas doesn't say so, I
take it that moral deference also involves a presumption in favor of such a person's claim
(in the face of the actor's denial) that something is disrespectful.
3. J.K. ROWLING, HARRY PO-TER AND THE CHAMBER OF SECRETS 112 (1999).
4. Arguably, the beneficence of an act might also depend on the actor's reasons for
doing it. The qualification is necessary only if we understand "aim" narrowly. In an example made famous by John Stuart Mill, a man saves someone from drowning in order to
torture him. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 25 & n.3 (Samuel Gorovitz ed., 1971)
(1861). The act surely is not beneficent. This can be captured either by saying that the
man's aim was not to save someone from drowning, but to save someone from drowning
and then torture him, or by saying that because of the man's reasons for saving him from
drowning, the act was not beneficent.
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another aim, it would be peculiar to call the act beneficent, particularly if the primary aim is contrary to the spirit of beneficence-as is
humiliating someone or "putting him in his place." The expressive

dimension of what outwardly looks like a beneficent action may lead
us to conclude that the aim wasn't really to aid, and therefore that the
action wasn't really beneficent after all. Generally, this is only the case
when the expression is so horrible that the material benefit pales in
comparison, leading one to say, "It wasn't worth it." We'll see an example of this later, from a scene in The Grapes of Wrath.'
Some beneficent acts shade into what are sometimes called "expressive acts." Expressive acts are those whose value lies entirely in
what is expressed, or in the fact that one is attempting to express concern (or warmth, or whatever; and the value may lie not in the fact
that one is attempting to express the precise thing one is attempting
to express, but that one is attempting to express something of that

sort). The clearest example is an expression of concern or sympathy
to someone, where the aim may be simply to express one's concern,
or sympathy, or sadness. Another example of an expressive act is A's
expressing to B that B means a great deal to A. These are acts whose
value lies solely in the expression, unlike acts of changing a tire for
someone, or providing a ride to the airport.6
Acts of comforting another and, in some instances, gift-giving
closely resemble some expressive acts, but are slightly different. Comforting another is not simply an act of expressing one's sympathy or
concern, for the aim is to comfort the other; and an act of expressing
5. JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH (1939); see infra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
6. I note that here again the question arises as to whether an act can be said to express sympathy or sadness or how much B means to A if B doesn't get the message. I am
inclined to say that it can, but also recognize that there is an excellent case to be made for
the opposing answer. Imagine the following exchange: "That [referring to something the
speaker said] was an expression of sympathy [or concern]." Respondent: "I didn't read it
that way" or "It didn't seem like that to me." Surely the reply does not show that the
expression was not what the actor says it was. And it would be unreasonable for the respondent to suppose that if he didn't see it as an expression of concern, it was not an expression of concern. However, one might argue that if we want to call it "an expression of
concern," it is because we think the speaker intended to express concern, or felt concern,
but (the suggestion continues) really, it was just an attempt to express concern. Although
"expression" and "communication" are not equivalent terms, in the case of what I have
been calling "expressive acts," it is plausible to hold that the act fails if A does not succeed
in communicating the concern or the warmth. It would be natural to say that although the
actor tried to express concern or sympathy, he failed. My leaning, though, is to stand by
the distinction between expression and communication and hold that, in this instance, the
actor expressed concern, but did not successfully communicate it to the intended
recipient.
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sympathy needn't have that as its aim, or even one of its aims. (The
actor may believe the person to be beyond comfort, but nonetheless
want to express his concern.) And when it is one of the aims, still the
aim of expressing one's concern is distinct from the aim of comforting another. One can try to comfort another and succeed in expressing (and indeed communicating) one's concern, but fail to comfort.
Gift-giving can be done with a variety of different aims, one of
which is to show someone how much the other means to the giver.
But usually one wants, in giving a gift, to give the person something
that she will really like, not merely to show someone how fond one is
of her.7 Of course one can best do the latter by doing the former.
The extent to which one makes plain, by giving the gift, how fond one
is of her, or how important the other is to her, will be affected by
one's success in giving her something that she will really like. This is
particularly the case if one gives a gift that suggests a very poor grasp
of the other's interests-for example, one gives a pair of hiking boots
or a book on hiking the Appalachian Trail to someone who hates the
outdoors and has no intention of ever hiking. So we should bear in
mind that the two dimensions-expressing something to the other
and giving her something she'll really like-are intertwined. But subtly. If I give a friend a book, and he already has it, but there is no
reason why I should know this, then if my choice of the book shows
that I have a good sense of his interests, the expression is unlikely to
be damaged by the fact that the book is not a good present for him.
Picture a continuum with expressive acts at one end and acts that
render clear "material" aid-such as changing someone's tire, or providing a jump-start-at the other. At the "material aid" end of the
continuum, what matters is that the tire is properly changed or the
jump-start successful (with no injuries or property damage incurred in
the process).' Also at this end of the continuum are the spectacular,
heroic deeds. The expressive dimension is far less important here
than in the case of expressive acts, where the expression is everything.
To see the moral importance of the expressive dimension of our
actions, and how that importance varies from one type of action to
another, it helps to look at what taints an action (or even ruins it altogether). An expressive act is a complete failure if what is expressed by
someone who takes himself simply to be expressing his concern for

7. I am not thinking now of the "corrupt" cases, where one's aim is to impress someone, to put the other in one's debt, or to show off one's wealth.
8. Not that the value cannot reside in the expression. Typically it does not, but one
could tell a story in which what mattered most to the recipient was the friendship or commitment expressed by the deed.
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his ill friend is "I told you so!"-as in "I told you you'd get cancer if
you didn't quit smoking!" At the other end of the continuum, the
expressive dimension is by no means entirely absent. A good deed
whose significance lies primarily in what is accomplished-in the material assistance-may be tainted by an expression of resentment concerning the time it is taking. I'll still be glad that my car is now
running, but if the person who offered the jump-start showed great
irritation while helping me, made disparaging remarks about the folly
that must lie behind the demise of my car battery, or grumbled about
all the things he would rather be doing, the beneficent act is certainly
tainted.
In extreme cases, the insult expressed in the manner in which the
benefit is conferred is so terrible that it leaves the "beneficiary" feeling
worse off. The Grapes of Wrath provides an example. The context is as
follows: Jessie is perturbed that Mrs. Joyce allowed her children to
become malnourished when at the government camp where they all
reside, food is provided to those who cannot pay, with the request that
they pay when-and only if-they find work. When Jessie demanded,
"How come you let your girls git hungry?" Mrs. Joyce replied, "We
ain't never took no charity."9 Dissatisfied with this answer, Jessie protests to Annie (after Mrs. Joyce has exited the scene), "She got no
right to be stiff-necked. She got no right, not with our own people."1
Annie tries to explain why someone might let her children go hungry
even in such circumstances:
"If a body's ever took charity, it makes a burn that don't

come out."
•.. "Las' winter.., we was a-starvin'-me an' Pa an' the
little fellas. An' it was a-rainin'. Fella tol' us to go to the
Salvation Army." Her eyes grew fierce. "We was hungrythey made us crawl for our dinner. They took our dignity.
They-I hate 'em! An'-maybe Mis' Joyce took charity.
Maybe she didn' know this ain't charity. Mis' Joad, we don't
allow nobody in this camp to build theirself up that-a-way.
We don't allow nobody to give nothing to another person.
They can give it to the camp, an' the camp can pass it out.
We won't have no charity!" Her voice was fierce and hoarse.
"I hate 'em," she said. "I ain't never seen my man beat
before, but them-them Salvation Army done it to 'im. ' "

9. STEINBECK, supra note 5, at 431.
10. Id. at 432.
11. Id.
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This is far worse than the person who expresses resentment while,
for example, still doing me the favor of changing my tire. The person
changing my tire is, it seems, ambivalent; she feels she should help,
but really hates having to take the time to do so. But her aim is still to
help me by changing my tire. By contrast, the Salvation Army
"soldiers," at least by Annie's report, seem to have had as their aim not
helping, but humiliating. (More precisely, helping seems to have
been subordinate to humiliating.) It is annoying to have someone
render assistance grumblingly, but it does not rob one of one's dignity. When, however, the affluent act as if their affluence shows them
to be more virtuous, and exact obeisance from the needy, the expressive dimension ruins the deed, and it suggests that the real aim was to
exploit the situation so as to have the pleasure of "lording" it (a telling
expression) over the needy, expressing in no uncertain terms who is
beholden to whom.
Beneficent acts by the affluent for the less well-off are especially
easily tainted, as Annie's story shows, even if they are rarely as thoroughly spoiled as the Salvation Army's were. Immanuel Kant saw how
delicate acts of charity are, and cautioned:
[W] e shall acknowledge that we are under obligation to help
someone poor; but since the favor we do implies that his
well-being depends on our generosity, and this humbles him,
it is our duty to behave as if our help is either merely what is
due him or but a slight service of love, and to spare him humiliation and maintain his respect for himself.1 2
Kant also advised that it is best, when possible, for the wealthy to aid
the poor anonymously. 3
12. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 198 (6:448-49) (Mary Gregor trans.
& ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797).
13. Id. at 202 (6:453). It is often held that, ideally, private charity, not the government,
would provide for the needy. One common reply is that even if this is ideal, private charity
is not to be relied on, and therefore, government programs are essential. Steinbeck's discussion via his characters suggests that even if it were reliable, private charity would not be
the ideal vehicle. Kant's discussion also lends some support to this thought, if we conjoin
to the passage just quoted the following reflection:
Having the resources to practice such beneficence as depends on the goods
of fortune is, for the most part, a result of certain human beings being favored
through the injustice of the government, which introduces an inequality of wealth
that makes others need their beneficence. Under such circumstances, does a rich
man's help to the needy, on which he so readily prides himself as something
meritorious, really deserve to be called beneficence at all?
Id. at 203 (6:454); see also id. at 100-01 (6:326) (arguing that the government may constrain
the wealthy to care for the needs of the poor). At least some forms of aid to the needy
ought to be delivered by the government to avoid a situation in which the more fortunate
"build themselves up" by being (or appearing to the recipients to be) the only source of
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3. Notice that when acts whose point is to offer material assistance are tainted, it is typically not because too little is expressed, but
rather because something is expressed that indicates contempt, resistance to providing the help, or a disturbing ulterior motive. Simply
providing the material assistance in a perfunctory way would not taint
the act. One would need to be extraordinarily full of himself to be
distressed that a motorist who stopped to help change his tire did not
show pleasure in doing this favor, or that someone who rescued him
from an accident did not adequately express sorrow over his injuries.
By contrast, an act of giving a gift, or offering solace, or letting someone know how much one cares for him can indeed be tainted by too
little expression-by performing the act in a perfunctory way-as well
as by the wrong sort of expression (for example, a sense of
superiority).
There are a lot of contextual details that make a difference here.
To name just a few: whether the person providing aid is legally required to do so; whether the person providing aid is someone close to
us, a casual acquaintance, or a complete stranger (and if someone
close to us, the history of the relationship also clearly bears on the
expressive dimension). And within a friendship whose depth is unclear, the aid could be a way of signaling a deeper commitment than
had hitherto been indicated, in which case the expressive dimension
could take on special importance.
Rather than explore the contextual details, I want to look briefly
at the beneficent acts that are midway on the spectrum and consider
how they can be tainted and then sum up and suggest a general conclusion regarding beneficent acts. I'm thinking of acts that are intermediate between purely expressive acts, such as acts of expressing
sympathy, on one end of the spectrum, and on the other, providing
desperately needed food, or assistance on a hiking trail to someone
who has twisted an ankle, or providing ajump-start. In between these
are, among the other beneficent acts, acts of gift-giving. Gift-giving is
easily tainted if the giver seems to be dumping on the recipient an
unwanted item, while presenting the item as if it were a genuine gift.
(A professor of my acquaintance gave as a Christmas present to the
sustenance for the very needy. If the aid is provided by the government, moreover, the
message can be, depending on how the aid is dispensed, that the recipients are entitled to
the benefits. Charity from private individuals is more likely to send a different message,
that is, that the beneficiaries are simply getting a hand-out. It might be, of course, that
those who oppose government welfare programs oppose them in part because they do not
think that the aid is something to which the needy are entitled, and thus prefer that if they
are helped at all, they be helped in a way that sends the message that they are getting a
hand-out, and perhaps also that they are indeed inferiors.
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department secretaries tile leftover from the renovation of one of his
bathrooms.) Gift-giving can also be tainted by intrusiveness and an
implicit judgment that something is amiss in the recipient's life, even
though the recipient has never volunteered to the giver that it is. For
his birthday, I give a friend a book entitled How to Save Your Marriage.
He has never expressed to me any concerns about his marriage, but
frequently bickers with his wife in my presence. Or, I give How to Take
Off Weight and Keep It Off to an acquaintance who is obese, but who has
never discussed the matter with me; or Raising a Difficult Child to a
friend who has never indicated that she regards her child as unusually
difficult, but whose child has been defiant and unruly at my home.
In summary, an otherwise good deed is tainted, sometimes even
ruined, if the act expresses contempt, condescension, determination
to keep at arm's length the people one is helping or (usually worse) to
control those whom one is helping, or simply the view-never encouraged by the recipient-that the recipient's life (or marriage, or
child, or health) is a mess. Expressive acts are easily tainted both by
the expression of something negative and by the absence of whatever
it is that one means to express; and insofar as a beneficent act approximates an expressive act, it too can be tainted either way. But usually,
if a beneficent act is tainted, it is by the expression of something negative (though, as noted, depending on the context, absence of a positive expression can taint it). In such circumstances, the act is tainted
either by signs that the actor is seeking to manipulate, control, or
reshape the person, or by an attitude of superiority (in virtue, social

class, or possibly skill or expertise), or self-importance. In each instance the actor may not intend to convey the message and may not
even be aware of his attitude.' 4 In all such cases, what the action expresses is a lack of respect.
Some might hold that if what is expressed is a lack of respect,
then the problem, contrary to what I have been saying, is a lack of a
positive expression. I have been suggesting that, usually, if a beneficent action is tainted, it is not by the absence of something that
should be expressed, but by the presence of something that shouldn't
be. But if what is expressed, in all those cases, is a lack of respect, does
this mean that what is needed is a positive expression of respect? I
don't think so. A beneficent act expresses respect unless there is
14. Expressions of superiority in skill or expertise are less likely to taint the action than
are other expressions of superiority unless the actor seems to be trying to "rub it in." By
contrast, expressions of self-importance and superiority in virtue or social class can easily
taint the beneficent action, even if the recipient does not believe that the actor intends to
draw attention to the presumed superiority.

2001]

THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF How THINGS SEEM

615

something in it that we can pinpoint that expresses disrespect. I mention this because I think it is a mistake to hold that an action is generally lacking in respect unless the actor makes a point of showing
respect. In some situations this is the case, but it does not hold as a
general rule.'

5

Deeds in the middle of the spectrum, because of their expressive
dimension, can be tainted by the absence of whatever it is that one
means to express as well as by the expression of something negative.
In addition, acts of gift-giving can be tainted by the clash between the
message expressed by the gift chosen and the message that is suggested by the very fact that the item is presented as a gift. Saying to
the department secretaries-or someone else-"Do you happen to
have any use for bathroom tile, or know someone who would? I have
a lot left over, and if someone were redoing a small bathroom, it
might be enough. I hate just to throw it away, and would like to give it
to someone who could use it" would be completely unobjectionable.
What is objectionable is presenting the tile as a gift, acting as if the
gesture is on par with bringing them gift certificates or boxes of chocolates. It is, as we say, the thought that counts, and the thought here
does not seem to have been a very nice one.
4. Before completing the shift I have already begun from beneficent actions to respectful actions, I want to mention another type of
expressive act: acts of expressing regret. A particularly interesting instance is an act done by someone who genuinely regrets something he
feels he must do (or has done, feeling he had no choice but to do it).

I am thinking of cases of what might be called "moral regret," to be
contrasted with, for example, the regret felt when one has to miss an
excellent concert.16 With moral regret, one realizes that one's choice
is probably very hurtful to another, perhaps (though not necessarily)
wronging him. An example would be a decision to leave an unsatisfying marriage, knowing that one's spouse and children will suffer because of the decision, and recognizing the possibility that, from their

15. It may hold as a general rule for respect in its non-egalitarian sense, according to
which respect is to be shown to certain people because they are one's superiors. This will
more commonly require doing something-for example, addressing someone as "Sir" or
"Madam." I mention this to bring attention to the fact that when "respectful action" is
used to refer to an action whose aim was to show someone respect, we are sometimes
talking about the non-egalitarian form of respect. It is important to pay attention to what
sort of respect it is that we are being called upon to express. Many of us will think it far
more important to take care that our conduct and public policies express egalitarian respect than that they express non-egalitarian respect.
16. I am imagining that the agent was not supposed to perform in the concert.
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perspective, nothing will ever make up for the initial anguish to the
extent that they will say, "It was painful, but it was all for the best."
Another example would be a decision to find a new home for a very
troublesome pet, a pet that one's children love; another would be a
decision to have an abortion, even though one's partner would prefer
that the pregnancy not be terminated. In each of these instances, the
act of explaining one's decision to a party who will be unhappy about
it will have a very important expressive dimension. It is not uncommon for films and novels to vividly illustrate how much worse things
can go if one expresses regret badly (or doesn't express it at all). We
wince watching the film, Room at the Top, 7 at the manner in which Joe
informs Alice that he is terminating their relationship, and we wish
that he would convey, rather than conceal, his anguish over having to
do so. Less memorable are the instances where the expression makes
an unfortunate action a little more tolerable, as when Hermione, in
Harry Potter and the Sorcerer'sStone, aptly expresses very genuine regret
to Neville just after casting the "full Body-Bind" spell on him so that
he won't stop them from their quest to get the Stone before
Voldemort or his agents do.' 8
In the context of a close relationship, what needs to be expressed
is not just respect-though that is certainly part of what should be
expressed. Those who are unlikely ever to feel "It was painful for
quite some time, but it was all for the best" want to hear that the other
person's choice is painful for him, that it is not easy to cause so much
pain to loved ones, and that he feels the pain too. One wants to hear
(in the case of the troublesome pet) both that he will miss the pet and
that he is genuinely pained at the sorrow that the loss of the pet will
cause the child. Where one party terminates a relationship (a humanhuman relationship) despite the wishes of the other, one wants to
hear even more: that the person who has chosen to terminate the
relationship feels at least some kind of strong emotional attachment,
some love, and is not simply indifferent to or, worse, disgusted with,
the other.
For the purposes of this Symposium, it is not the expressive
dimensions of such actions as these that mainly concern us. Other expressions of regret are far more significant. I am thinking here of
apologies to those we have wronged, or to those who were wronged by
our ancestors, or who differ from the wrongs of our "forefathers,"
wrongs which, though our ancestors did not commit them, our ances17. ROOM AT THE Top (VCI 1959).
18. J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTrER AND

THE SORCERER'S STONE

273 (1998).
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tors did nothing to stop or to try later to rectify. These apologies are
all expressions of regret that do not occur within the context of a
close relationship. Examples include apologies with reparations to
Japanese-Americans who were interned in camps by the United States
government, apologies to descendants of slaves in the United States,
Germany's reparations to various victims of the Nazis, and German
companies' reparations to those whom they used as slave laborers during the Third Reich.
It is noteworthy that the apologies, even without reparations,
seem to mean something to the recipients even when, as is very often
the case, the apologies do not come unbidden. (Of course there are
exceptions, a noteworthy one being an apology that seems to be offered in lieu of reparations or some other action that the survivors are
demanding.) More often than not, the apologies come only after the
absence of any apology is repeatedly noted and protested or lamented. The apologies matter insofar as those apologizing accept responsibility, possibly for the deeds themselves, but possibly for not
having opposed the actions, for turning a blind eye, or for simply failing-perhaps refusing-until now to acknowledge that what happened
was wrong. Acceptance of responsibility is important, and dodging responsibility ('Yeah, it was wrong, but I wasn't the one who made the
decision") is more than annoying. But equally important is the acknowledgment that what was done was seriously wrong, that these people
were wronged, and that they count. The apology is a reassertion, in the
light of what seem to be contrary claims-and years of silence that
seems to suggest concurrence-that they too are persons and fully deserve to be treated as persons.
Apologies and reparations are not the only way to express this.
Other ways include abandoning an offensive mascot at the request of
the group that says it is offensive (for example, "Chief Illiniwek" at the
University of Illinois, so far not abandoned) and ceasing to fly the
Confederate flag or to display it on one's truck. Another meaningful
gesture-indeed, a gesture that may well be crucial if apologies are
not to ring hollow-is Germany's renaming of a military base."9 Instead of being named for a general who was never linked to any atrocities in his military actions, but who agreed in 1942 to become an
"honorary judge" of the People's Courts of the Third Reich ("vehicles

19. See generally Roger Cohen, New Model for Soldiers in Germany, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2000,
at A3 (discussing Germany's decision to rename a military base that was originally named
for Gfinther Rudel, a general who "had been held up as a hero and example in the first
decades after World War II").
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for the administering of Hitler's brutal whims"2"), the base is now
named for Anton Schmid, an army sergeant who saved more than 250
near Vilnius, and who was executed by the Nazis
Jews while stationed
21
for his

acts.

In the cases of mascots and the Confederate flag, the decision
may require "moral deference" to members of the oppressed groupof "diminished social category," as Laurence Thomas puts it 22 -if

those in favor of the mascot or flying the flag believe that what they
champion is in no way disrespectful. Moral deference involves listening-really listening-"until one has insight into the character of the
other's moral pain, ' 23 and most importantly, it involves "a presumption in favor of the person's account of his experiences. '24 On the
question of whether something is offensive to a certain group, moral
deference involves a recognition that members of that group have insight into the matter that outsiders lack.25
In each of these cases, what is shown, above all else, is respect.
This is particularly true when moral deference is involved because
moral deference involves a willingness to set aside one's own take on
the issue at hand and listen to that of another, crediting the other
with an insight one realizes one may lack. 26 As Thomas says, "[m]oral
deference is meant to reflect the insight that it is wrong to discount
the feelings and experiences of persons in diminished social category
groups simply because their articulation of matters does not resonate
with one's imaginative-take on their experiences. '27 Moral deference
involves overcoming, or at least temporarily shelving, arrogance.
5. Reflecting on expressions of regret has led us to the topic of
respect, and it is not surprising that it has, since the expression of
respect seems to be at the heart of what makes apologies and the like
meaningful, at least outside the context of close interpersonal relationships. Within interpersonal contexts, there are various reasons
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Thomas, supra note 2.
23. Id. at 377.
24. Id. at 374.
25. See id. (noting that members of a diminished social category speak from a vantage
point to which nonmembers do not have access). This is perhaps an extension, on my
part, of Thomas's concept. I think Thomas would agree with my statement, but he does
not speak to assertions that something is offensive. I should note that significant disagreement among members of the group as to whether a particular symbol is offensive or not
complicates the issue.
26. See id.
27. Id. at 375.
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why apologies and expressions of moral regret are meaningful to the
recipient; outside of that context, in the context of law and public
policy, what explains their importance is in large part the respect that
is shown to the recipient. Respect is expressed in many ways-in the
willingness to acknowledge wrongdoing (and to acknowledge that particular others were wronged and that the wrongs were not minor), in
welcoming input, in not silencing dissent or criticism, and in not expecting the others (those who have been wronged) to take a "backseat" role in the discussion of policies or the nature of the wrong at
issue.
We should note that in many contexts an action is respectful simply by not being disrespectful. But against a backdrop of disrespect, it
may take more than an absence of disrespect to be respectful. (Or we

might say that in not addressing the disrespect, one may be treating it
as unimportant, and this itself shows disrespect.) So although it is
generally the case that an action is respectful by virtue of not expressing disrespect, in some circumstances I can only express respect by
saying or doing something that aims to correct, or at least recognize, a
wrong against the person. If I am at a gathering where someone (not
present) is being discussed in a dismissive or scoffing manner, I might
show respect for that person by taking issue with the disrespectful remarks. Or I might show respect for a graduate student who is bravely
speaking up at a department meeting only to be silenced, by supporting her in her point or by urging (even if I do not agree with her on

the point she raised) that we take the matter seriously.
In addition, there are policies and courses of conduct that aim at
expressing respect, 28 in the manner noted in the last Section. The
German government's decision to rename a military base so that it
bears the name of a man who sought to thwart Nazi atrocities rather

than the name of someone who lent his imprimatur to them represents one such course of action 2 9 (unless the aim was quite differentfor example, simply to improve the image of the military). Public acknowledgment of a grave injustice after years of silence expresses respect to those who were wronged because it serves as recognition that,
contrary to what had previously been implied, those persons do indeed count.
Before leaving this topic, I want to mention a rather different instance of a policy whose importance lies, in no small part, in its ex-

28. And at related aims, including setting a good example and taking care not to lend
moral support to white supremacists or to those who wish to forget or minimize injustices.
29. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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pression of respect-and in its acknowledgment that the positive
expression is needed because of the past wrongs: affirmative action
policies. Shaping affirmative action policies in one way rather than
another, and opting for them in the face of certain familiar objections, expresses respect. This is nicely brought out by Thomas Hill,
Jr., in The Message of Affirmative Action,3" from which I will quote at
length. Hill claims that it is a mistake to suppose that "social policies
can be settled entirely by debating the rights involved or by estimating
the consequences, narrowly conceived apart from the messages that
we want to give and the messages that are likely to be received."3 1
Discussions of affirmative action programs have by and large neglected the question of "what message we should try to give with affirmative action programs and what messages we should try to avoid."3 2
Focusing on public universities, Hill suggests that the message they
should aim to convey is "something like this":
"Whether we individually are among the guilty or not, we acknowledge that you have been wronged-if not by specific
injuries which could be named and repaid, at least by the
humiliating and debilitating attitudes prevalent in our country and our institutions. We deplore and denounce these attitudes and the wrongs that spring from them. We
acknowledge that, so far, most of you have had your opportunities in life diminished by the effects of these attitudes, and
we want no one's prospects to be diminished by injustice.
We recognize your understandable grounds for suspicion
and mistrust when we express these high-minded sentiments,
and we want not only to ask respectfully for your trust but
also to give concrete evidence of our sincerity. We welcome
you respectfully into the university community and ask you
to take a full share of the responsibilities as well as the benefits. By creating special opportunities, we recognize the disadvantages you have probably suffered, but we show our
respect for your talents and our commitment to ideals of the
university by not faking grades and honors for you. Given
current attitudes about affirmative action, accepting this position will probably have drawbacks as well as advantages. It
is an opportunity and a responsibility offered... as part of a
special effort to.

.

. encourage minorities and women to par-

ticipate more fully in the university at all levels. We believe
30.

THOMAS E.
189 (1991).
31. Id. at 190.
32. Id.

SPECT

HILL, JR.,

The Message of Affirmative Action, in

AUTONOMY AND SELF-RE-
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that this program affirms some of the best ideals implicit in
our history without violating the rights of any applicants. We
the position in this spirit
hope that you will choose to accept
33
as well as for your own benefit.

Reflection on the message we should send and the messages we
should avoid sending provides a reply to a familiar objection to affirmative action. It is often claimed that unless those implementing affirmative action look at each case separately (and thoroughly) to
determine whether the applicant really has suffered a significant loss
of opportunity because of racism or sexism, a number of those who
benefit most from affirmative action will be people "who have actually
had, on balance, as much opportunity as white males., 34 Examining
each case thoroughly is hopelessly impractical. Should we then
choose not to have an affirmative action program at all? Hill asks us
to consider what we would be saying if we made this choice.3 5 The
message, he suggests, would be this:
"We cannot find a way to ensure precisely that each talented
and hard-working person has an equal opportunity over
time; and, given our options, we count it more important to
see that none of you women and minorities are overcompensated than to try to see that the majority of you have more
nearly equal opportunities over your lifetime. Your grievances are too subtle and difficult to measure, and your group
may be harboring some who were not disadvantaged. We
would rather let the majority of white males enjoy the advanto risk compensating one
tages of their unfair headstart than
'
of you who does not deserve it."36
That we would be sending such a message by choosing, for the reasons
indicated, not to have an affirmative action program is a very weighty
reason against such a decision.
6. I find it so obvious that the expressive dimensions are morally
important that it is difficult to explain why they are morally important.
I am far less convinced of the moral importance of appearances
(apart, of course, from those instances where the appearances are no
different from the reality).7 It seems to me unquestionable that we
should pay attention to the expressive dimensions of our conduct, and
33. Id. at 209-10 (footnote omitted).
34. Id. at 208.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. I limit my discussion to instances where appearances differ from reality, because
when they do not, there is no question but that the appearances are morally significant.
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to the messages sent by court rulings and by having or eliminating
certain laws. But it is far less obvious that we should pay attention-or
at least as serious attention-to how our actions might appear to
others, or how a court ruling or a legislative change might appear to
others.
Consider affirmative action. It is one thing to say, as both Hill
and I do, that (A) in considering the pros and cons of affirmative
action (and of a particular affirmative action program), we should factor very seriously the message it expresses. It is another matter to hold
that (B) if adoption of affirmative action programs will appear to
some to indicate that those favoring the programs believe that women
and members of the relevant "minorities" are intellectually inferior to
white males, then this is a strong reason not to have affirmative action
programs. I am not claiming that (B) is patently false, but it is different from (A) and, if true (as I doubt), is not obviously true.3 8 To be
sure, that some will see affirmative action as confirming racist or sexist
suspicions is a problem that needs to be addressed. And one way to
address the problem is to devise affirmative action programs in such a
way that they do not express that message. But even if the programs
do not, there may well be some who see the existence of the programs
as an indication that women and non-whites really are intellectually
inferior, or at least that those who support the programs think they
are. This is not a strong reason against having such programs. 9
What, one might ask, warrants taking the message our actions express more seriously than how our actions might appear to others
(where it is not the case that how they appear is equivalent to what
38. Its truth hangs to some extent on how common that reaction to affirmative action
is, but not entirely. Surely it would be much better to address the reaction, taking care to
shape the affirmative action program properly and not dilute standards, rather than to
take the reaction as a fixed point that has to limit our options. Its truth also depends in
part on who has this reaction. I agree with Sarah Buss that if the people who thought that
affirmative action insults minorities were the intended beneficiaries themselves, then this
would have moral significance. Sarah Buss, In Defense of Appearances: A Reply to Marcia
Baron's "The Moral Significance of How Things Seem," 60 MD.L. REV. 642 (2001).
39. Hill writes:
White males unhappy about the immediate effects of affirmative action may read
the policy as saying that "justice" is the official word for giving preferential treatment to whatever group one happens to favor. Some may see a subtext insinuating that blacks and women are naturally inferior and "cannot make it on their
own." Such cynical readings reveal either misunderstanding or the willful refusal
to take the moral reasoning underlying affirmative action seriously.
HILL, supra note 30, at 211.
We can do quite a bit to address misunderstandings, but it is very hard to do anything
about willful refusal. What we can do is not cater to it-not allow their willful refusal to
shape our decision.
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they express)? In a nutshell, it is this: I have a responsibility to attend

to what my actions express. And it is not terribly burdensome or disruptive to do so; in fact, it seems part and parcel of good conduct. By
contrast, there is no end to the possible mistaken beliefs to which my
actions might give rise, and it would be destructive to peace of mind,

and perhaps to good character, to try to anticipate all the possible
mistakes. To have to alter my conduct accordingly would be more
burdensome still. There are exceptions, and I will enumerate them
via a discussion of examples. But in general, we should not hold ourselves responsible for the mistaken beliefs to which our conduct gives
rise. There are situations where the consequences are so severe that
we may judge that, regrettably, we had better alter our conduct lest
dangerous, mistaken beliefs arise; but the consequences have to be
very dire indeed. By contrast, if my conduct expresses disrespect, I

ought to alter it, and this needn't be for consequentialist reasons
(much less because of really dire consequences).
7. What about situations where my goal in acting in a certain
way is to influence others to act similarly? There it will matter enormously that others see my action accurately. If (unlike most vegetarians) I choose to be a vegetarian mainly with the aim of influencing
lots of others (by my example and my good vegetarian cooking) to
also be vegetarians, and I have people over to a dinner that includes
what tastes remarkably like meatballs, but are in fact made of soybeans, it will be important (at least if they taste good) to announce

loudly that these are indeed made of beans. Even so, it would be a
little far-fetched to say that I would be wrong to serve soyballs without
announcing that they are soyballs, even if I am a committed vegetarian. The same point holds for the example (discussed both by Julia
Driver4" and by Deborah Hellman in her contribution to this Symposium4 1 ) of someone wearing faux fur that looks very much like real
fur. I don't see that it is wrong to wear remarkably convincing fake

fur; still, if my aim is not to support the practice of trapping and killing animals for their fur, either directly by buying the furs or by (even
inadvertently) encouraging others to do so, it would be unwise to wear
fake fur without at the same time donning a button decrying fur coats
or, as Driver suggests, a "Great Fake" button.4 2 In these two examples,

40. Julia Driver, Caesar's Wife: On the Moral Significance ofAppearing Good, 89J. PHIL. 331,
333-34, 338, 342-43 (1992).
41. Deborah Hellman, Judging by Appearances: ProfessionalEthics, Expressive Government,
and the Moral Significance of How Things Seem, 60 Mo. L. REV. 653, 664-65 (2001).
42. Driver, supra note 40, at 343.
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part of my aim in avoiding animal products in certain forms is undermined if I replace them with a terribly convincing substitute. If I do
act wrongly (and it seems to me a stretch to say that I do) in serving
convincing soyballs or soyburgers, or in wearing faux fur that looks
very much like the real thing, the wrongness consists in my undermining my aims.43
But in many instances where we are enjoined to pay attention to
appearances, it is not because our own aims will be undermined if we
do not. When I was in high school, my parents urged me to stay home
on the Jewish high holy days even though we weren't observant and
would not be spending the day in the synagogue. They reasoned that
if I attended school, some ignorant people, knowing that I am Jewish
and that many Jewish students stay home on Rosh Hashanah and Yom
Kippur, would judge that if I go to school on those holidays, Jewish
students who stay home surely don't really need to and are just exploiting the situation to have some days off. It seems to me now, as it
did then, that it was not my responsibility to worry about the fallacious
inferences that others might possibly draw from my conduct. I knew I
belonged in school, and that is where I wanted to be.
Consider a different example. A male professor is scheduled to
teach abroad the following year in a study abroad program affiliated
with his university. He is asked to pick a graduate student who will be
his teaching assistant in the overseas program. He picks a female student, someone who has assisted him before, in his home university,
and whom he knows to be excellent and highly reliable. Some of his
colleagues are very perturbed by his choice. They worry that others
will think that he and the graduate student are lovers, and that this
will reflect badly on the university. Under pressure from his colleagues, the professor reluctantly decides he'll have to choose someone else instead, and he tells the student that, regrettably, she will not
be able to participate after all. Clearly, the cost of allowing "appearances" to enter in here is very high for the student, and as long as
most of the faculty are male, and are, or are presumed to be, heterosexual, the female students (except, perhaps, those who are openly
lesbian) will be at a considerable disadvantage if such worries are allowed to shape decisions about who will serve as the teaching assistants in the study abroad program. And it is easy to generate other
examples of the same sort. Indeed, it is easy to think of other stories
that, like the one about the study abroad decision, are true. In a department where I recently taught, female graduate students who re43. It matters that the aims are not unworthy and arguably are very good aims.
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ceive a lot of attention from their male professors are often rumored
to be having an affair with one or more of those professors. Rumors
are enthusiastically disseminated by some of the male graduate students who seem anxious to explain away the successes of successful
female graduate students. The behavior giving rise to the rumors varies from having long discussions alone with the professor in his office,
to having dinner or coffee alone with him. Should the male professor
avoid being seen alone with the female student? There are two ways
to avoid this (apart from meeting with the students two or more at a
time, or in some other way arranging to have another person present
during their discussions). The most obvious one would be not to give
the female student the attention that she would get if she were male,
or if the rumors weren't flying. To do this would mean depriving her
of the graduate education to which she is, as a student in the program
working on a dissertation, surely entitled. Another way would be to
meet secretly so that the nosy, resentful graduate students hopefully
do not see them together. This would of course create its own dangers (confirming the suspicions, if the meetings are discovered) and
might well make the student and the professor uncomfortable in any
case.
Still, reactions will differ as to whether any effort at all should be
made to avoid giving the appearance of having an affair. In a discussion of such problems as the rumor problem just noted, one faculty
member agreed that the rumors, and especially the accusatory remarks addressed to the graduate student, were uncalled for, but also
said that the faculty member and the graduate student really should
not dine out alone together, as it would likely give rise to suspicions.
(When asked if this wasn't unfair to women graduate students, he said
that there should be no one-on-one dinners between graduate students and faculty members, regardless of gender. I'm not sure if this
was a case of biting the bullet, or if he genuinely held this opinion.)
My own view is that they should not have to avoid going out to dinner
together, much less avoid talking at length in the professor's office. It
is understandable if either chooses not to meet anywhere outside the
professor's office because they find the prospect of rumors too annoying; but surely they are not to be faulted if they choose to meet for
dinner. Nor do they forfeit the right to complain when rumors circulate and she is said to have received a fellowship or a teaching award
only because of her (alleged) affair with him. The matter is different
if the issue is not whether to ignore rumors and go out to dinner
together, but whether to allow the rumors to affect how long or how
often they talk in his office about her dissertation and related matters.
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If the professor decides to keep discussions with female thesis students
to a shorter time period to avoid giving rise to rumors, something is
very wrong. Likewise, if she doesn't feel free to go to his office very
often because it requires walking past the office of some nosy, resentful graduate student, something is very wrong.
8. So what reason is there for thinking that appearances are
morally important, and should factor seriously into decisions about
how to conduct ourselves? What reason is there for thinking that, as
Julia Driver has claimed, to appear to be acting immorally may itself
be immoral?44 In this Section and the next, I will consider what can
be said in support of this position, and I will also try to locate the
underlying disagreements between those who support it and those
who reject it.
Consider first an objection that might be raised concerning the
examples I have given. It might be objected that the reason why many
of us do not find the appearance of an amorous relationship between
a professor and a graduate student objectionable is that we are not
convinced that such relationships are always morally objectionable in
the first place. So let's consider conduct we'll all agree is very wrong
indeed. We'll all agree that murder is wrong; ditto for child molesting, rape, and robbery. Is it clear that appearing to commit such a
crime is itself wrong? I don't think so. Nor is it clear that one should
put any energy into not appearing to a bystander to be committing
such crimes. There is surely a cost to a habit of worrying, or simply
thinking about, whether one's actions might be misperceived by
others and, if so, whether this might, as Driver says, "corrupt" the onlooker's "morals."4 5 Caution lest one is thought to be molesting a
child could result (perhaps has resulted) in too few hugs and caresses
for children on the part of camp counselors, teachers, and possibly
even relatives. With a qualification to be noted in a moment, it seems
44. Driver writes:
I shall explore the question of whether an action that is not immoral in virtue of any independent reasons can be bad, or immoral, in virtue of resembling
an immoral action. The answer will be "yes." What is surprising about this answer
is that it means that, in an important class of these cases, the immorality of some
actions will depend completely on the mistaken beliefs of other people.
Driver, supra note 40, at 331.
45. See id. at 333. I also find her examples of instances where there is such a risk implausible. "If someone witnesses an action that she thinks is directly immoral, then the
witness's morals could be corrupted." Id. How so? "A person who witnesses the desecration of some bodies, for example, may become callous and brutal." Id. Well, maybe; I'd
think it at least as likely that witnessing atrocities would leave one outraged, determined to
try to do something to prevent further atrocities.
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to me that to the extent that one should worry about how one's conduct might appear to others, it is only for prudential reasons. A scene
in Spike Lee's Jungle Fever4 6 comes to mind: when Flipper and Angie
are having fun, playing around, an onlooker, seeing an African-American man pushing a Caucasian woman down onto a car, calls the police.47 It might well have been imprudent of the couple to engage in
such fun in public, though one would hardly want to advise interracial
couples (more specifically, those in which the woman is Caucasian
and the man African-American) to avoid doing anything that might
appear to an onlooker, who assumes that white women wouldn't consent to any physical intimacy with African-American men, to be an
assault. But in any case, surely we would not consider their conduct to
be immoral simply because it could have been predicted, given the
prevalence of racism, to give rise to a false belief that an assault was
taking place.
Now if the situation is one where someone knowingly (even if
unintentionally) induced or gave rise to a fear on the part of the would-be
victim that he or she was about to be murdered, raped, or seriously
injured, then I agree that it is wrong (unless necessary under the circumstances) to have so acted. The same holds even if the actor only
recklessly or negligently gave rise to this fear-that is, the actor was
aware of the likelihood that the other would fear this, or wasn't aware
but should have been. But notice that the actor's conduct is wrong
not just because it induces a false belief, but because it induces a fear
on the part of the would-be victim.4 8 Note too that its wrongness hinges
49
on it being a foreseeable fear.
There are other reasons to take the appearances to be morally
important. If in some of the examples given earlier the risks had been
much more serious, the force of the consequentialist considerations
would be much stronger. If there had been a serious possibility that
my fellow students would be expelled from high school for staying
home on the high holy days, when I, also Jewish, did not, I imagine I
46. JUNGLE FEVER (Universal Pictures 1991).
47. Id.
48. I don't mean to be placing emphasis on its being a fear, as opposed to a belief that
one faced an imminent danger. What is important (in addition to its being foreseeable) is
that it was not just the belief of a bystander, nor a belief that, say, the other was about to
tickle him.
49. The fear needn't be reasonable-though of course reasonableness is relevant, because it is much more likely to be foreseeable if it is reasonable. If I know that the other
person will believe I am about to attack him-because I know him well enough to know his
irrational reactions-I act wrongly if I proceed anyway (assuming it was not necessary
under the circumstances). That his fear was unreasonable doesn't change the wrongness
of my conduct.
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would have been willing to stay home.5" Certainly, that would have
been a strong reason for me to do so-assuming that there was no
other way around the problem, such as explaining when a teacher
asked (as one in fact did), "What are you doing in school, Marcia?"
that Jews, like Gentiles, differ in the degree to which they observe the
holidays and the various religious prohibitions. If, by dining alone
together, the professor and the student ran the risk that the professor
would be fired and the student expelled (let's imagine that this is a
very strict religious school, and that this would be considered adequate evidence that the two were romantically involved), they would
have a strong reason to refrain from doing so. Even so, it would not
be immoral for them to do so, but only unwise.
9. An underlying disagreement between those, like Driver, who
take appearances to have considerable moral significance and those,
like me, who take the significance to be slight, is simply how attentive we
should be, as agents, to possible consequences of our actions-consequences
that might arise because of innocent mistakes, ignorance (culpable or
not), or unreasonableness. Related to this, we differ about the extent to
which we should hold ourselves responsiblefor such risks, altering our conduct
accordingly lest we occasion, or contribute to, a misperception that has
consequences of some moral significance.
To the extent that the worry is that someone's morals will be corrupted5 1 (rather than, as in my example about Jewish religious observance, the risk that others will be ill-thought of because of one's
actions), another difference enters in. This difference concerns the
extent to which we should try to improve, or at least not "corrupt,"
others' characters. My own view is that, generally, it is not really my
business to worry that others, seeing me do x, will mistakenly believe
50. Notice, though, that this does not lend support to Driver's claim that to appear to
be acting immorally may itself be immoral. See supra note 44. This is an instance, rather,
where my conduct may (inadvertently and only because of others' stupidity and mistrust)
make the conduct of others appear to be immoral.
51. I am referring here to Driver's repeated concern about the corrupting effect of a
mistaken belief that action x, which is not immoral, is in fact action y, which is. Driver
explains:
If an action resembles an immoral action, then it is not surprising that it could be
misunderstood as independently immoral in some contexts ....
Such misconstrual can corrupt the morals of others ....
...
For example, in the Caesar's wife case, the witness thinks that Pompeia
has committed adultery when in fact she has not, and comes to the conclusion
that adultery must be all right after all.
Driver, supra note 40, at 334.
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that I am doing y, which they correctly hold to be wrong, and will then
decide that if I am doing y, it must be okay for them to do it.
First, just as an empirical fact, it seems to me unlikely that my
choices would so strongly influence other adults. It is different with
children, especially my own. I certainly should pay attention to possible misunderstandings my child might have of what I am doing, misunderstandings that might lead him to think that something is
permissible that in fact is not. If I am practicing my part for a play
behind closed doors, and my child, overhearing me, thinks I am
screaming at someone over the phone, he might judge that civility
cannot be all that important if this is how his mom talks to people.
Very few other people are likely to be swayed, by my supposed election
to engage in a certain activity, into thinking that what they had hitherto thought was wrong must actually be all right after all.52
So much for the empirical point. But what if, in a particular instance, the risk of misconstrual really is high? I am willing to grant
that if, for some reason, the risk is high, and the issue is a serious one,
I should modify my behavior accordingly. But again, the stakes would
have to be very high.5" In general, however, I think that we should
leave the task of character improvement (and character maintenance)
to the owner of the character.5 4

52. If I were a very important person, things might be different. Those who are looked
up to as moral paragons-religious leaders, judges (in limited contexts), and elected officials (also, arguably, in limited contexts, though expectations vary wildly on this) have special responsibilities. Note, though, that we should not simply take as a fixed point the
expectations of exemplary conduct. Another possibility might be to resist the expectations. I gather from a friend who was a schoolteacher in a small town in the South that
there are places in the United States where teachers (or is it only female teachers?) are
expected to be models of virtue. It is easy to imagine communities in which professors (at
least of certain subjects) are expected to be wise people with impeccable conduct. I imagine most of us would believe such expectations should be resisted, if possible, if we lived in
such a community. Whether professionals and elected officials should be held to have
special responsibilities as moral exemplars is not an issue I will address in this Article.
53. This marks a sharp difference between my view and Driver's. See Driver, supra note
40, at 341-42.
54. I recently faced this question with regard to a relative whom I love dearly-a fine
person with, however, a rather severe tendency to hoard. Knowing that most floors in her
home are covered with piles of clothing and miscellaneous items, I wondered if I really
should be offering her goods that I am getting rid of. I recalled Immanuel Kant's admonition that although it is one's job to improve one's own character, not those of others, one
should not give a pillow to a lazy fellow so that he can pass away his life in sweet idleness, or
see to it that the drunkard is never short of alcohol. KANr, supra note 12, at 224 (6:481). I
decided that the vice was not serious enough that I should worry about my very modest
support of it, and I went ahead and offered her the items. Concern not to abet vices has to
be weighed against the demands of respect, which calls for leaving it to others to choose
their own course of self-improvement, and indeed to embark on any such course. This
being the case, it seems silly to worry, with regard to competent adults, that they might
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10. The last difference reflects a disagreement between consequentialists and non-consequentialists. This difference can be seen as
reflecting a tension within consequentialism (and more specifically,
within utilitarianism), as well as a disagreement between consequentialists and non-consequentialists. It encompasses two issues: (1) how
concerned we should be to avoid giving offense (I'm thinking here of
unwarranted offense), and relatedly (2) to what extent we should take
as fixed points people's likely reactions to certain kinds of conduct.
We can distinguish between two utilitarian approaches. The first approach takes the likes, dislikes, sources of pleasure and pain-the
likely affective reactions-as givens. Put more simply (though a bit
artificially), it takes preferences to be fixed points, to be factored as
such into any utilitarian calculus. There is no thought that those preferences might well change, that deciding against taking them to be
fixed points might facilitate such change, and that such a change
would be salutary (from a utilitarian perspective). The second approach, that ofJohn Stuart Mill, takes a longer-range, more optimistic
view, hoping that the preferences-reactions, sources of pleasure and
pain-may change, and that the change will be helped along if we do
not treat the preferences as fixed points.5 5 This approach takes into
account not only the likes and dislikes as they now are, but also the
likes and dislikes as we can project they might well be if we do not
cater to the current likes and dislikes. The first approach is usually
seen as more purely utilitarian, but provided that there is sufficient
reason to anticipate a change in people's preferences, the latter surely
can also count as utilitarian-indeed, as no less utilitarian.5 6 Which
approach is better?
In raising this question, I have in mind the following example
from Julia Driver's Caesar's Wife: On the Moral Significance of Appearing
Good:
mistake my actions for a different sort of action-one that is morally wrong-and might
then "copy" me.
55. This emerges especially clearly in On Liberty, a work some find hard to even reconcile with utilitarianism because they are so used to thinking that utilitarianism has to factor
in actual preferences or what, given people's current likes and dislikes, will promote happiness. But Mill lets us know that he thinks of utility differently: "I regard utility as the
ultimate appeal on all ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense,
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being." JOHN STUART MILL,
ON LIBERTIY 10 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1978) (1859). It is clear
throughout the work that he is thinking of people as they can be, with sufficient education
and sufficient liberty, and with a social climate in which individuality is appreciated.
56. By contrast, it is not at all clear that distinguishing between higher and lower
pleasures, as Mill does, and discounting lower pleasures, are consistent with utilitarianism.
See MILL, supra note 4, at ch.2.

2001]

THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF

How

THINGS SEEM

631

Misconstrual can . . .lead to giving unnecessary offense to
others. When I visit my grandmother, for example, I am
careful not to take along any book that might have 'sex' in
the title. Even though any such book in my possession would
be a purely scholarly work, my grandmother probably would
not realize this, and become distressed and offended.5 7
A different approach would be to go ahead and take the book along if
that is the reading material she is currently engaged in, figuring that it
wouldn't kill her grandmother to learn that there are respectable
books on the topic, or that respectable people read books with "sex"
in the title. Driver could chat with her about the content of the book
if she feared that her grandmother would assume the book was about
how to devote one's life to sexual pleasure, giving up everything else
just for (the hope of) more intense, or varied, or frequent sexual ecstasy. Utilitarian deliberation would take into account not only the
displeasure that her grandmother might feel upon glancing at the title, but also the possibility that seeing the tide, and then hearing what
it was in fact about, might lead her to revise her views, to substitute
truth for error, and, if not actually to read the book herself, at least to
cease to look askance at anything with "sex" in the title. This will in
turn mean that Driver no longer has to screen her selection of books
to take along on visits to her grandmother-all in all, a net gain in
utility.
Although Driver doesn't consider this possibility, she does address a somewhat related response to her example: doesn't the unreasonableness or reasonableness of misconstruals factor in?58 She
acknowledges that such misconstruals as the one she anticipates from
her grandmother may well be unreasonable, but she denies that the
unreasonableness bears on the question of whether one should alter
one's conduct to prevent misconstrual.5 9 She rejects the view that
"the agent is only responsible for reasonable misconstruals that others
make-not the unreasonable ones." 60 "A consequentialist will argue,"
she says, "that this distinction is basically irrelevant since, as long as
the misunderstanding can be predicted, it must figure into the agent's
calculations."6 But although the misunderstanding must figure in,
consequentialists should also factor in the long term effects. Catering
to such beliefs about sex or books with "sex" in the title may hinder

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Driver, supra note 40, at 341-42.
Id. at 342.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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social progress, just as (say) a woman's choice to change her name to
her husband's when she gets married just because not doing so will be
disturbing to her in-laws helps to entrench the custom-and to entrench negative reactions to the choice not to change one's name.
The same is true of a lesbian couple's choice not to hold hands in
public. In each of these cases, there may be compelling reasons for
the decision in question. Driver's grandmother might be so easily undone and in such shaky health that the risk of disturbing her is too
great; good relations with one's in-laws may be too important; and the
risk of violence against the couple who hold hands in public may be
too high.
The general point is this: altering our conduct, lest it give rise to
distress, is problematic not only because we should not have to be
responsible for unwarranted reactions, including reactions based on
unreasonable mistakes. It is also problematic on purely consequentialist grounds (if we take a long-range view): social progress is stifled
if we allow the predictable reactions to the action in question to determine our options. This is true in all cases where the mistaken belief,
or outrage, or distress arises because of narrow-mindedness (believing
that there is something wrong with reading any book about sex; thinking that all Jews surely have identical religious practices and are all
equally observant, together with suspicion that they might be trying to
pull something over on one; finding homosexuality disgusting).62
11. There is another reason, related to the very consequentialist
one mentioned above, for crediting appearances with considerable
moral significance. So far we have looked at four sorts of cases. First,
a type emphasized by Driver, where someone thinks that I am engaging in x when I am not, and an observer for some reason thinks that x,
which he had hitherto regarded as wrong, must be all right after all if
I do it. Second, also mentioned by Driver, is the case where someone
is offended-hence pained-because she believes (falsely) that I am
doing x, which she finds unseemly, when in fact I am doing y. A third
case is one in which something I do or omit leads others to think that
something others are doing must be wrong. (This is the case of think62. 1 have been focusing on cases where the reactions are unwarranted (though in
some instances predictable). What about cases where the reaction was predictable and not
unwarranted? For example, S is aware that the shrieks that are a part of the theatre role
she must rehearse at home are audible to one of her neighbors, and that her noise may
alarm him, perhaps even lead him to call the police. I grant that S should notify her
neighbor that she is an actress and rehearses her part at home. The effort needed on her
part is slight and surely called for under the circumstances. Thanks to Cheshire Calhoun
for this example.
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ing that if one Jew doesn't stay home in observance of a Jewish holiday, those who do stay home must be playing hooky.) A fourth case
(which could, with a different twist, be assimilated to the first) is the
one where the professor and student who spend a lot of time talking
together are supposed by others to be having an affair, and the circulation of this rumor leads to assertions that the student's professional
success is due to her alleged affair with her professor.
Let's consider a variant on the first case. Seeing that I am doing
x, an onlooker may think, "If she can get away with that, I bet I can,
too '63 or "Ifshe is going to do that, why shouldn't I?" This points to a
reason for regarding appearances as morally weighty. Some social
conventions are important, and their survival arguably depends on
widespread belief that there is general conformity to the conventions.64 Insofar as we need social conventions so as to know what to
expect of each other (regarding, for example, property and privacy),
and insofar as our motivation to abide by the conventions is dependent on our belief that others will also abide by them, appearances are
morally significant, and it behooves us to take care lest we give rise to
a mistaken belief that might undermine the convention. Take any
convention you think is important. (Keeping secrets, not invading
others' privacy by reading their mail without their permission, refraining from sneaking into others' gardens to pick their vegetables,
or whatever.) If it is the case that most individuals are motivated to
adhere to the convention only if they believe that virtually everyone
else also adheres to it, then it will be important not to appear to be
flouting it.65
This is a fairly strong argument for the moral importance of appearances in some circumstances: insofar as there are social conventions that are very important to maintain, and insofar as conformity to
the conventions is motivationally dependent on the belief that everyone else (or almost everyone else) is conforming strictly to the conventions, we will not want others to think that we are not strictly
conforming our conduct to these conventions. But note all the quali63. Driver mentions this risk as well: "[W]itnessing the supposedly immoral act causes
there to be less pressure on [the observer] to avoid those immoral acts. Thus he will go
ahead and do them." Driver, supra note 40, at 334.
64. I do not mean to endorse this claim, but only to be presenting an argument that
might be put forward in favor of regarding appearances as morally weighty.
65. In some cases, what matters is that this particularconvention remain our convention. In others, it matters that a convention of roughly this sort persist. And in yet others,
it doesn't really matter what the convention is, but it matters enormously that there not be
chaos and confusion: we need to know whether our convention is to drive on the left side
of the road or on the right.
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fications: it has to be very important that the convention remain a
convention, and it has to be the case that individuals' motivation to
abide by the convention is dependent on their belief that everyone
else (or most others) are also abiding by the convention. Even then
we need to weigh the value of upholding the convention against its
costs. If, in order to maintain the convention, a great deal has to be
sacrificed so as not to weaken it by acting in ways that might give rise
to the false belief that the convention is being violated, it is likely that
the cost outweighs the value. Perhaps the (important) interests served
by having the convention can be served, at less cost, in some other
way. If so, we might well judge that there is no point in avoiding conduct on the grounds that it threatens to undermine the convention,
for the convention isn't worth it.
It is important not to underestimate the costs. They include not
only having to conform one's conduct to the conventions and having
to ensure that others think-indeed, feel quite sure-that one is abiding by the conventions. There is also the cost of having to pay attention to whether others think one is so conforming one's conduct, to
what might lead others to mistakenly believe that one is not, and to
what one needs to do in order not to give rise to such mistaken views.
The cost is not only the nuisance, though that is itself considerable.
Paying so much attention to appearances makes it difficult to develop
or retain a proper appreciation for what really matters. Honesty is
likely to be devalued. What comes to matter most to us is what others
think we are doing, not what we really are doing. This point holds in
general for attending to appearances, whether or not the argument
for doing so is couched in terms of conventions: more than a very
small amount of attention to appearances risks screwing up our values
(if they are not already screwed up).6 6 And we should note that the
same considerations that would support not doing x if it might give
rise to the belief that I am doing y, which will lead others to feel less
obliged to refrain from doing y, would also support pretending to do
z, if this will encourage others to do z-type acts (supposing that z is a
morally desirable act and y is a morally undesirable act).

66. I remember seeing a stack of pre-written, pre-addressed postcards a friend of my
mother's had given her to send, every few days, to the friend's son. Her son was at summer
camp; she was going on a vacation for a few weeks and didn't want to have to think about
sending postcards to him while on vacation. What matters, she thinks, is only that her son
get these postcards and feel that his mother, while off on a vacation, is thinking of him
fondly, writing him postcards every few days. What matters is how it appears to her son
(whom she for some reason assumes will not notice the postmark).
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Perhaps one difference between those who attribute considerable
moral significance to appearances and those who do not concerns
how common they think it is that the conditions indicated above obtain (that is, that general conformity to the convention really is important, that it will only happen as long as there is a general belief that
there is general conformity, and that the costs of general adherenceand in maintaining the general belief that there is general conformity-do not outweigh the value of the convention). Clearly, there can
be a number of different disagreements here: the value of the conventions, the nature and seriousness of the costs, and so on. And
more broadly, they may differ over their conception of what morality
is, some viewing it as primarily a set of conventions or moral rules to
which we want everyone to conform. If we believe that the whole
point of morality (or most if it, anyway) is to have a set of rules to
which we all conform, and to uphold these rules and help or pressure
others to conform to them as well, then appearances will be very significant indeed.6 7
Even if we think that conventions are only one part of morality,
we might hold that appearances are important because of their role in
upholding the conventions. To appreciate more fully what their role
is-and the costs of emphasizing the appearances-let's look at the
richest and most nuanced account of conventions in the history of
ethics-that of David Hume.
Conventions are by no means all there is to Humean morality.
Only the artificial virtues, not the natural virtues, are defined in terms
of conventions. Some virtues, like benevolence, are, Hume holds, just
part of human nature (provided it isn't perverted by a terrible childhood, or by the delusory influence of some religious teachings).
Other virtues, most notably justice, are not part of human nature, but
are extremely important.6 8 The latter virtues, "artificial virtues," are
dependent on conventions. They are virtues only thanks to a convention of so regarding them, a convention which indicates how we are to
act; and we are motivated to act justly (and in other ways in accor-

67. Bernard Gert claims that "morality is best conceived as a guide to behavior that
rational persons put forward to govern the behavior of others, whether or not they plan to
follow that guide themselves." BERNARD GERT, MORALITY. ITS NATURE AND JUSTIFICATION 9
(1998). I take issue with this picture in Marcia Baron, Character,Immorality, and Punishment,
in RATIONALITY, RULES, AND IDEALS: CRITICAL ESSAYS ON BERNARD GERT'S MORAL THEORY

(Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Robert Audi eds., forthcoming 2002).
68. "[ T ] here are some virtues, that produce pleasure and approbation by means of an
artifice or contrivance, which arises from the circumstances and necessity of mankind. Of
this kind I assert justice to be ...." DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 477 (L.A.
Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1973) (1739).
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dance with the artificial virtues) only to the extent that we believe that
most others in our community are likewise conforming their conduct
to the convention that defines the virtue in question. Justice, for
Hume, is in essence a matter of abstaining from taking others' property without their permission; property, contrary to John Locke's
claims,69 is not part of nature. It is an "invention." But whereas
"[m] ost of the inventions of men are subject to change" and "depend
upon humour and caprice," 7° this is not the case with justice, Hume
emphasizes, nor with the other artificial virtues. "The interest, on
which justice is founded, is the greatest imaginable, and extends to all
times and places. It cannot possibly be serv'd by any other inven'72
tion. "71 The "invention is obvious and absolutely necessary.
Now if, as Hume thinks, our motivation to abide by the conventions regarding property is dependent on our belief that others are
abiding by them, it will be important that people not suspect that
others are violating the rules governing property. Believing it vital
that the conventions regarding property not disintegrate, we will each
be concerned that others think that we are observing the rules regarding property. (I'll skip over the reasons why Hume thinks we'll be
motivated actually to observe the rules, rather than simply to make
others think we are observing the rules; 3 but even though the focus is
on the former, it makes good Humean sense to take an interest not
only in observing the rules, but also in not giving the impression that
one ever violates the rules.7 4 )
As noted above, the value of following the conventions in order
not to undermine others' motivation to comply with the conventions
has to be weighed against the costs. And since we not only have to
follow the conventions, but also have to avoid appearing as if we are
not following them, the costs may be considerable. Consider the set
of conventions that fall under the headings of chastity and modestyvirtues whose requirements apply much more fiercely to women than
69. SeeJoHN LocKE, Of Property, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 133-46 (Thomas I.
Cook ed., 1975) (1690).
70. HUME, supra note 68, at 620.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 484.
73. Briefly, he holds that "we never fail to observe the prejudice we receive ... from the
injustice of others," and via sympathy, we come to feel the disapproval which others would
feel toward us if we acted unjustly. Id. at 499. In this way we come to see acts of injustice as
not merely imprudent, but morally wrong. (And being an internalist, Hume holds that to
see that something as morally wrong is to be at least somewhat motivated to refrain from so

acting.)
74. For a more detailed account of Hume's artificial virtues, see Marcia Baron, Hume's

Noble Lie: An Account of His Artificial Virtues, 12 CAN. J. PHIL. 539 (1982).
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to men. Hume's discussion of chastity and modesty brings out the
purpose the conventions serve, and although he speaks approvingly of
the convention,
his explanation at the same time gives an idea of their
75
hefty

CoSt.

Chastity and modesty are, for Hume, decidedly not natural virtues. He does not hold that it is part of human nature to refrain from
sex outside of marriage-nor that it is part of female human nature to
do so. People refrain, he thinks, thanks to an artifice-to a convention, and an ideology that goes with it. The expectation that women
do so-and the view that it is less important that men do so-Hume
explains via the following points: There must be a "union of male and
female for the education of the young," a union of "considerable duration," and "to induce the men to . . . undergo chearfully all the

fatigues and expences, to which it subjects them, they must believe,
that the children are their own, and that their natural instinct is not
directed to a wrong object, when they give a loose to love and tenderness."7 6 Whereas it is easy for women to know that their offspring is
theirs, it is not easy for men to know7 7 (though, of course, today it is
considerably easier to attain certainty in this matter than it was in
Hume's time). It is to give men security in this matter that women are
expected to refrain from sex with anyone other than their husbands,
and that shame is attached to female infidelity. 8 Indeed, because of
the difficulty in imposing punishment (because of the difficulty obtaining legal proof in these matters), we instead "attach a peculiar degree of shame to their infidelity, above what arises merely from its
injustice, and . . . bestow proportionable praises on their chastity.""

And that is not all. Women, even very young girls, are expected to be

75. HUME, supra note 68, at 570-73. In a later work, A Dialogue,Hume sounds far less
supportive of the strict requirement that women never engage in sex outside of (or prior
to) marriage. Hume states:
The consequence of a very free commerce between the sexes, and of their living
much together, will often terminate in intrigues and gallantry. We must sacrifice
somewhat of the useful, if we be very anxious to obtain all the agreeable qualities;
and cannot pretend to reach alike every kind of advantage. Instances of licence,
daily multiplying, will weaken the scandal with the one sex, and teach the other
by degrees, to adopt the famous maxim of La Fontaine, with regard to female
infidelity, that if one knows it, it is but a small matter; if one knows it not, it is nothing.
DAVID HUME, A Dialogue, in ENQUIRIES CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING AND CONCERNINC THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 324, 339 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed.
1975) (1777). Thanks to Kate Abramson for pointing this passage out to me.
76. HUME, supra note 68, at 570.
77. Id. at 570-71.
78. Id. at 571.
79. Id.
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modest, and women are expected to lack an interest in sex. 8 0 It is
necessary, Hume says, that "beside the infamy attending such licenses,
there shou'd be some preceding backwardness or dread, which may
prevent their first approaches, and may give the female sex a repugnance to all expressions, and postures, and liberties, that have an immediate relation to that enjoyment."81 Moreover, women past childbearing age "have no more privilege" than younger women, because if
extramarital sexual relations were permissible for them, it would no
longer be possible to maintain the conventional view that sex outside
of marriage is shameful for women.8" If that "peculiar degree of
shame" were no longer attached to sex outside of marriage-to women's engagement in it, that is-the motivation to abstain from sex
outside of marriage would weaken, and the convention would be
undermined.
This is a complex illustration of the costs involved in upholding
appearances. The appearances that are being maintained here are
both the appearances of behaving a certain way, and a fiction-or, put
differently, an ideology. First, it is as crucial that women appearto be
faithful to their husbands as that they be faithful-indeed, it is more
crucial that they appear to be faithful. What matters, given Hume's
story, is how things appear to their husbands. (Were Hume not so
eager to endorse the convention, including the greater demand it imposes on women than on men, perhaps he would observe that husbands would be a lot more confident that their wives were faithful to
them if the prohibition on sex outside of marriage-and the shame
attending its violation-applied as strictly to men as to women.)
But, as Hume recognizes, other appearances have to be upheld as
well. The fiction maintained by the convention and necessary to its
survival is that something is very shameful when, in fact, given Hume's
views, it is merely imprudent, and even then, only in limited circumstances. This is how it is with the artificial virtues. Although they (and
the conventions that define them) do indeed have a foundation in
human nature and the circumstances in which humans live, their continued existence is due in part to an ideology that exaggerates their
importance.8 3 This is especially true of chastity, less so ofjustice, but it
holds for justice, too.
80. Id. at 571-72.
81. Id. at 572.
82. Id. at 572-73. "[Tjhe general rule carries us beyond the original principle, and
makes us extend the notions of modesty over the whole sex, from the earliest infancy to
their extremest old-age and infirmity." Id. at 573.
83. For a defense of this claim, see Baron, supra note 74.
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Now the high cost involved in upholding some conventions and
the dubiousness of the conventions do not tell against the moral significance of appearances. However, the costs are an indication that
one of the strongest arguments in favor of regarding appearances as
morally important-that part of morality consists in conventions, and
that at least some conventions depend heavily for their survival on a
general belief in general compliance to them-is weaker than it might
first appear. We need to consider the value of the conventions,
whether their demise would be a significant loss, whether they have
not perhaps outlived their usefulness (if indeed they were ever worth
preserving), and the costs of maintaining them. Only by considering
these matters can one defend the importance of endeavoring not to
prompt a false belief that one is flouting a convention.
12. In the preceding five Sections, I offered only very qualified
support for the view that we should accord moral significance to appearances-to how our actions appear. By contrast, I take the expressive dimensions of our actions to have very clear moral significance.
Why, one might ask, such a disparity (even allowing that when I talk
about how our actions appear, I am only talking about those appearances that clash with reality-those instances, that is, involving a mistaken belief about the nature of the action, or about what it
expresses)? After all, if the idea is that I should attend to the expressive dimension of my actions, how different is this from saying that I
should attend to how my actions appear to others?
Let me first summarize my position regarding how our actions
appear. I am reluctant to hold that we ought to-that is, are wrong
not to-attend to the appearances, except in the following circumstances, in which cases it seems clear that we should attend to them:
(1) situations in which our conduct is likely to give rise to a fear (reasonable or not) of some serious harm to the observer-for example, a
fear that I am about to stab the observer; (2) situations where the
likelihood of dire consequences is high enough that even if the observers' mistake is due to their prejudice or eagerness to find fault, we
should, particularly if the harm will befall someone other than ourselves, consider altering our conduct so as not to give rise to the appearance of wrongdoing; (3) situations where I have a special
responsibility as a moral exemplar, as I do to my child (but I would
not include under this the responsibility of professionals, except in
very limited domains-judges need to appear, as well as be, impartial,
but they need not, it seems to me, be or appear to be model citizens);
and (4) instances where a misperception of our behavior will contribute significantly to undermining a convention, where it is crucial that
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the convention survive. One other situation deserves mention: (5) if
there is, or recently was, a climate of mistrust (especially, but not only,
if we are partly responsible for that climate of mistrust), the importance of (re)establishing trust may call for special attention to how
our actions may appear. (Of course this can backfire; if our actions
and words seem too carefully calculated to give off the right appearance, they may seem less genuine.) 4
Why, if only in those situations it is the case that we should-are
wrong not to-attend to the appearances, do I think that we should in
general attend to the expressive dimensions of our conduct? The expressive dimensions of our conduct are important for two reasons.
First, if an attitude or sentiment is morally important, so is its expression in an action. If we think that respect is important, then clearly it
is important that our actions express respect-either by not expressing disrespect, or, in a context in which others' conduct (or one's
own former conduct) expressed disrespect, by acting in a way that
reasserts the value of the person who was treated dismissively or
demeaningly. The second reason concerns the rather different sort of
case where the action may express x even if x is not something that the
actor feels or thinks. The action (flying a Confederate flag or displaying it in one's window; using a certain phrase, epithet, or gesture, and
so on) expresses x, or has a certain meaning, because the community
or the culture gives it that meaning. Wearing a swastika expresses
something; the protest, "But I just like the shape! I don't mean to
express support for Nazism or White Supremacy; I don't mean anything by it at all" in no way undoes that. When the meaning of a
symbol is clear and generally known, it makes sense to hold people
responsible for expressing something, or conveying a message, by
their use of the symbol. Actions, gestures, and the wearing of symbols
all have public meanings, and it is surely not unreasonable to hold
ourselves and others responsible for attending to those meanings.8 5
Holding people responsible for unintentionally giving rise to a
mistaken belief that their actions (or someone else's, as in the example of staying home on the Jewish high holy days) are immoral is a
different matter altogether. The very fact that the belief is mistaken
makes it less plausible to hold the actor responsible for anticipating it;

84. Reflection on Deborah Hellman's contribution to this conference has helped me
to see the need to add (5). See generally Hellman, supra note 41.
85. For discussions of public meanings, see generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard
H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503, 1524-31
(2000), and the articles and commentary in this Symposium that discuss Anderson and
Pildes's article.
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and even when one does anticipate it, it is by no means clear that it is
the actor's responsibility to alter her conduct accordingly. A lot hangs
on the culpability of the observers: are they eagerly looking for something to gossip about, or worse, to get someone in trouble? Does their
mistake arise because of bigotry?86 Even if the observers held the mistaken belief through no fault of their own, unless the matter was a
serious one and the mistake was easily foreseeable, I do not think actors should be held responsible for attending to the possibilities of
mistaken beliefs about their conduct. It is far more important to monitor all the things we really should attend to, and there is a limit to
how much we can adequately attend to. In addition, as noted above,
attention to how our actions appear to others runs the risk of distorting our sense of what really does matter. The appearances come
to matter too much. There is no such risk in the case of attending to
the expressive dimensions of our conduct-unless what is attended to
is the possibility that this expression just might express, to some,
something we definitely do not want to express.
Sometimes the public meaning of a symbol is contested. If it is by
no means clear whether our action expresses x or not, the responsibility to attend to the expressive meaning of our action is somewhat
weaker-and all the more so if the possibility that it does express x is
not one that many people would recognize. "Might this seem to some
to signify x?"" T is a question that some, in some occupations, will have
to attend to often; university administrators, for example, are burdened with such responsibilities. So there is a point of convergence
between the question of appearances and the question of the expressive dimensions of our conduct; they converge if the action does not
express an attitude or sentiment of the actor's, and if the public meaning is contested. Apart from that, however, it seems to me that the
responsibility of the actor to attend to appearances is considerably
weaker than is her responsibility to attend to the expressive dimensions of her conduct.

86. As noted, it also hangs on how dire the consequences are, and how hard or easy it
is to alter one's conduct so as not to give rise to the mistaken belief.
87. Or, framing it without any hint that we are only asking about the appearances:
"Will this, to some, express x?"

